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I. INTRODUCTION
That in United States v. Lopez' the Supreme Court of the
United States modified the law of the Interstate Commerce
Clause is obvious.2 Exactly to what extent the Court modified
it is not. But interpretive questions about Lopez aside, others are
more fundamental. Should the law of the Interstate Commerce
Clause as it existed prior to Lopez have been changed at all? If
so, how?
This article attempts two things. First, it distinguishes
alternative interpretations of Lopez and discusses its implications
for the future. Second, it argues that the law of the Interstate
Commerce Clause as it existed before Lopez cannot be justified
and that, however Lopez itself is best interpreted, it does not take
us far enough in the right direction-that of becoming a
federalist republic once again.
II. THE LAW OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE BEFORE LOPEZ
An understanding of the possible implications of Lopez
requires an understanding of the prior state of the law. The
Interstate Commerce Clause provides that Congress "shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce... among the several States
.... ,' Thus, any plausible interpretation of the clause must
include interpretations of "regulate," "commerce" and "among
the several states," or, "interstate," as the last phrase is usually
paraphrased.
A. "Commerce"
According to the Court, "commerce" includes at least the
following: buying and selling,4  navigation,5 the electrical
transmission of telegraphic messages,6 transporting of goods by
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. The Court had not invalidated a federal statute regulating private sector
commercial activity under the Interstate Commerce Clause since 1936. JOHN E. NOwAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.9, at 162 & n.27 (5th ed. 1995).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
4. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
5. Id. at 190-93.
6. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 464 (1882).
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railroad,7 transporting persons and goods by ferry for consider-
ation,' persons walking across bridges, whether or not consider-
ation is involved,9 the travel of prostitutes," the travel of one's
mistress," livestock walking from range to market,12 cattle
walking back and forth in pastures,1 3 carrying liquor for person-
al use in one's own vehicle, 4 petroleum moving through pipe-
lines, 5  radio communication,16  electrical power transmis-
sion, 17 the movement of pollutants in the air" and the move-
ment of water. 9 This list could be indefinitely extended.
The sample suggests a generalization. "Commerce" includes
any activity, process, event or state of affairs-human or nonhu-
man, commercial or noncommercial.
B. "Interstate"
Whatever else the scope of "interstate" may include,2° it
surely includes the event of something crossing a state line.21
Thus, putting the meaning of "interstate" together with that of
"commerce" yields the generalization that interstate commerce
includes any activity, process, event or state of affairs-human or
nonhuman, commercial or noncommercial-at the instant it
7. Id.
8. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885).
9. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 218-19 (1894).
10. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 315 (1913).
11. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 472 (1917).
12. Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1, 8 (1903).
13. Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414, 425 (1926).
14. United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 466 (1920).
15. The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 560-61 (1914).
16. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,
276 (1933).
17. Federal Power Comm'n. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 464
(1972).
18. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968).
19. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972). The foregoing citations are
collected in DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 93-102
(2nd ed. 1987).
20. See ENGDAHL, supra note 19, at 102-08.
21. United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 423-24 (1919). The Court reasoned that
"[i]mportation into one State from another is the indispensable element, the test, of
interstate commerce." Id. (quoting International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 107
(1910)). The Court ultimately held that the transportation of liquor for personal use
from one state to another is an activity within the "well established meaning of the
words 'interstate commerce'." Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez, 228 U.S. 525, 532
(1913)).
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crosses a state line.
C. "Regulate"
"Regulation" includes any rule, including an absolute
prohibition.22 Thus, putting the meaning of "regulate" togeth-
er with those of "interstate" and "commerce" yields the general-
ization that under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress has
the power to prescribe any rule, including an absolute prohibi-
tion, regulating any activity, process, event or state of af-
fairs-human or nonhuman, commercial or noncommercial-at
the instant it crosses a state line.
D. Things "In" Interstate Commerce and "Direct Exercises" of the
Interstate Commerce Power
I shall say that an activity, process, event or sate- o . affairs is
"in" interstate commerce at the instant it crosses a state line. I
shall also say that Congress makes a "direct exercise" of the
interstate commerce power when it regulates an entity, process,
event or state of affairs that is in interstate commerce in this
sense. The Court does not require that direct exercises of the
interstate commerce power have, as a primary or ultimate
objective, any interstate commerce concern or any other
enumerated federal concern, for that matter.2" For example,
Congress may prohibit the interstate transportation of goods
manufactured by workers whose wage and hour conditions fail
to satisfy federal standards, even though Congress' primary
objective is coercing the workers' employers to conform to those
standards-a nonfederal concern.24
E. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Congress has power to regulate concerns that are not
themselves enumerated federal concerns if regulating them is a
"necessary and proper" means of accomplishing objectives that
22. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (holding that Congress' power
to create rules that regulate interstate commerce "extends not only to those regulations
which aid, foster and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it").
23. Id. at 115 ("The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are
matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places
no restriction and over which the courts are given no control.").
24. Id. at 125.
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themselves directly pertain to enumerated federal concerns. 5
Such exercises of power are based upon the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which gives Congress the power "To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof."
26
Such means do not have to be necessary conditions in the
literal sense of being indispensable for the accomplishment of
their ends. It is sufficient that they be useful or appropriate.
Congressional uses of the Necessary and Proper Clause
power, as linked to the Interstate Commerce Clause power, need
satisfy only rational basis judicial review.2 That is, courts may
invalidate such exercises of Necessary and Proper Clause power
only if they justifiably conclude that no rational basis exists for
Congress' belief that the regulation in question will causally
affect interstate commerce.
2 9
Any particular use of the Necessary and Proper Clause is
constitutional if a rational basis exists for believing that among
the causal consequences of the statute in question would be at
least one side effect upon something that is itself in interstate
commerce. It does not matter if Congress' primary or ultimate
objective pertains to a nonfederal concern.' For example, a
statute prohibiting racial segregation in privately-owned motels
is constitutional because it is rational for Congress to believe that
one of the causal side effects of the statute would be an increase
in the rate at which members of racial minority classes cross state
lines. It does not matter that Congress' primary purpose in
enacting the statute was to racially integrate part of the private
sector-a nonfederal concern. 1
Statutes based upon the Necessary and Proper Clause, as
linked to the Interstate Commerce Clause power, need satisfy
25. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819).
26. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
27. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420-21, 424-25 (recognizing the power of
Congress to pass a law that created a federal Bank of the United States for the purpose
of executing and implementing the "great powers assigned" to the bank by Congress).
28. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1995).
29. See id.
30. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
31. Id.
1996]
5
Pannier: Lopez and Federalism
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
W/LL/AM M/TCHELL LAW REV!EW
only the "class basis principle." 2 That is, they are constitutional
so long as it is rational for Congress to believe that the statute's
regulation of a class of things or activities would have a causal
side effect upon interstate commerce." Congress need not
establish that it would be rational to believe that the regulation
of any particular member of the class would have any effect
upon interstate commerce at all.
F The Darby Method of Legislation
The method of legislation upheld in United States v.
Darby 5 relies upon both the Interstate Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause in a way that affords Congress
an especially powerful tool. Darby involved a challenge to two
sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.6 Section
15 (a) (1) prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced
in factories employing workers under conditions violating the
substantive wage and hour requirements of the Act.37 Section
15(a) (2) reached directly into the factories themselves by
requiring the employers to conform to the wage and hour
requirements of the Act.' The Court upheld section 15(a) (1)
on the basis of the argument that Congress may regulate
anything that is itself in interstate commerce in any way Congress
wishes.39 Congress may prohibit the interstate movement of
anything for any reason whatever. It does not matter that
Congress may not have any ultimate interstate commerce
objective, or any objective pertaining to any other enumerated
federal concern, for that matter.' The Court went on to
32. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 303-04 (1964) (affirming the
constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a private
restaurant that was deemed to be within the scope of the Act and was within a class
defined by the Court as a restaurant that "serves or offers to serve interstate travelers
or a substantial portion of the food which it serves... has moved in commerce").
33. Id. at 304-05 ("The absence of direct evidence connecting discriminatory
restaurant service with the flow of interstate food ... is not, given the evidence as to the
effect of such practices on other aspects of commerce, a crucial matter.").
34. Id.
35. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
36. Id. at 108.
37. Id. at 110.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 112-17. Of course, exercises of federal legislative power are always subject
to the liberty guarantees of the Constitution.
40. Id.
[Vol. 22
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uphold section 15 (a) (2) under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
as linked to the Interstate Commerce Power.4" One of the
Court's arguments was that section 15(a) (2) was a reasonable
means of promoting the legislative agenda of section 15(a)-
(1) . 12 That is, if there were no goods made by workers whose
wages and hours fail to conform to federal standards, then no
such goods will cross state lines.
The generalization is obvious. Suppose that Congress wants
to regulate some particular activity that is not itself within the
scope of any enumerated federal concern. Under Darby,
Congress need only enact a statute prohibiting some interstate
aspect or causal side effect of the given activity and enact
another statute prohibiting the activity itself. I shall refer to such
exercises of legislative power as exercises of the "Darby method
of legislation."
For example, suppose that Congress wishes to prohibit the
manufacture, sale and consumption of cigarettes in the United
States. Using the "Darby method of legislation," Congress could
enact a statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of
cigarettes. That provision would be constitutional on the basis
of the principle that Congress may do anything it wants in
directly regulating things in interstate commerce. Then
Congress could enact another statute simply prohibiting the
manufacture, sale and consumption of cigarettes in the United
States. The second statute would presumably be upheld on the
basis of the argument that if there were no cigarettes manufac-
tured, sold or consumed in the United States, then no cigarettes
would cross any state lines.
G. Summary
An example may serve to illustrate at least some of the
implications of all this. Suppose that Congress decides that
potato chips are bad for people. Before Lopez, Congress would
have had at least three constitutional alternatives. First, it could
enact a statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of potato
chips. That statute would be constitutionally grounded upon the
principle that Congress can directly regulate interstate commerce
in any way it wishes for any reason it wishes. Second, Congress
41. Id. at 117-24.
42. Id. at 117-22.
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could enact a statute prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or
distribution of potato chips. That statute would be based upon
the Necessary and Proper Clause, as tied to the Interstate
Commerce Clause Power. For it would be rational for Congress
to believe that prohibiting the manufacture, sale or distribution
of potato chips would have at least one causal side effect upon
something in interstate commerce. If nothing else, there would
probably be a reduction in the rate at which bags of potatoes
and boxes of salt were carried across state lines. Third, by
invoking the Darby method of legislation, Congress could enact
both of the statutes at once.
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRE-LOPEZ STATE OF THE
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION
The question whether there is a conflict between the pre-
Lopez state of the law and the Constitution necessarily involves
the question whether there is a conflict between the pre-Lopez
state of the law and federalism, for whatever else the Constitu-
tion sets out to do, it obviously sets out to establish a federalist
system.
How should "federalism" be understood in this context?
One might plausibly begin by stipulating that a nation has a
"federalist legal system" if and only if (1) the nation has a
national legislature representing the geographical whole and
regional legislatures representing geographical subparts of the
whole, (2) the regional legislatures are independent sources of
law in the sense that they have power to enact legislation without
the consent of the national legislature, and (3) the validly
enacted laws of the national legislature pre-empt those of the
regional legislatures in the event of a conflict.
Condition (1) serves to rule out legal systems with just one
legislature. Condition (2) rules out systems with regional
legislatures that are not independent of the legislature represent-
ing the whole. For example, the relationship between a state
legislature and component municipal legislatures is not a
federalist relationship in this sense, at least when the municipal
legislatures do not have a constitutionally based home-rule status.
Condition (3) rules out confederations and leagues in which no
single legislature has pre-emptive power over the other legisla-
tures in the system.
Two varieties of federalist systems can be distinguished. I
[Vol. 22
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shall say that a federalist system is a "concurrent-powers federalist
system" if and only if its national legislature has the power to
enact legislation concerning every subject matter over which the
regional legislatures have legislative power. In contrast, a
federalist system is a "reserved-powers federalist system" if and
only if there exists at least one subject matter over which the
regional legislatures have legislative power, but the national
legislature does not.
In addition, I shall say that a legislature has "general- welfare
powers" if and only if it has the power to enact any legislation it
believes would promote the common good of the persons subject
to its jurisdiction.43
Assuming these stipulations, one may plausibly conclude that
a concurrent-powers federalist system could accommodate a
national legislature possessing general-welfare powers, but that
a reserved-powers federalist system could not. For unlike their
concurrent-powers counterparts, reserved-powers systems set
,aside a particular set of subject matters and place them beyond
the legislative powers of the national legislature. But no
legislature lacking power over at least one subject matter could
have general welfare powers. For having general-welfare powers
entails having power to enact any legislation which the rule-
makers believe would promote the common good.
Now, although there is a sense in which a concurrent-powers
federalist system is logically compatible with a national legislature
possessing general welfare powers, it seems that any such
combination would, at least over time, tend to lose its federalist
nature. This prediction can be supported by the following
considerations. Imagine a concurrent-powers federalist system
with a national legislature that has general-welfare powers. Now
consider an arbitrarily-selected subject matter, M, which is within
the scope of the legislative powers of the regional legislatures.
There are two general cases to consider.
In the first general case, the national legislature has not yet
regulated M. Suppose that one of the regional legislatures
decides to regulate M. As a regional legislature in a federalist
system, it has the power, at least initially, to regulate M without
the national legislature's consent. Suppose that the regional
43. Subject, of course, to whatever liberty guarantees the relevant constitution
provides.
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legislature does so by enacting a statute. If the national legisla-
ture does not like the regional legislature's statute, it can
override it by enacting a statute of its own. For, as a general-
welfare legislature whose laws have pre-emptive force, it has the
power to override any laws enacted by the regional legislatures.
Suppose that the national legislature does choose to override the
regional legislation by enacting its own statute. Now that the
national legislature's statute is the law of the land, the regional
legislatures are no longer free to regulate M as they please.
Their federalist legislative independence has been limited, at
least with respect to M.
In the second general case, the national legislature has
already regulated M by means of a statute. As a legislature with
general-welfare powers and pre-emptive powers, it can regulate
M in any way it wishes. In this situation the regional legislatures
would not have power to regulate M in ways that are inconsistent
with the national legislature's statute. Thus, the federalist
legislative independence of the regional legislatures would again
have been limited, at least with respect to M.
Putting these two general cases together, one can say that,
at least with respect to the subject matter, M, there is a sense in
which the regional legislatures would have no power to regulate
M without the consent of the national legislature. For if the
regional legislatures regulate M before the national legislature
does, then the latter can later pre-empt the regional regulation
of M. Thus, in such a case there is a sense in which the regional
legislatures would be able to continue to regulate M only with
what is, in effect, the "later" consent of the national legislature.
On the other hand, if the national legislature regulates M before
the regional legislatures do, then the latter would be able to
regulate M only in ways consistent with the national legislation,
that is, only with the "prior" consent of the national legislature.
Now imagine this pattern multiplied by indefinitely many
subject matters. It is then easy to recognize the truth of the
prediction that concurrent-powers federalist systems are inherent-
ly unstable. And if that prediction is correct, then the only
inherently stable federalist systems are reserved-powers systems.
Does our Constitution purport to establish a concurrent-
powers federalist system or a reserved-powers system? Clearly, it
purports to establish the latter. There are several ways of
showing this. First, the Constitution's specific enumeration of
[Vol. 22
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Congressional powers presupposes a set of powers not enumerat-
ed, and thus impliedly retained by the states.' Second, if there
could be any doubt about this implied reservation of powers, the
Tenth Amendment makes the presupposition explicit: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."' Third, the Framers intended
the Constitution to be so interpreted. As James Madison puts it
in Federalist Number 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefi-
nite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce;
with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part,
be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity
of the State.46
Hence, the pre-Lopez state of the law is inconsistent with the
Constitution, as originally intended. The pre-Lopez interpretation
of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause gives Congress general-welfare powers. Indeed,
given the Court's broad interpretation of those two clauses, there
would have been no need for any of the other power-conferring
clauses.47 But the Constitution, as originally intended, does not
give Congress general-welfare powers. Of course, what ought to
be done, if anything, about the contradiction is another matter.
But the fact of a contradiction seems beyond doubt.
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE CONTRADICTION?
Thus, the pre-Lopez state of the law conflicts with the
44. U.S. CONST. art. I.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
47. In his concurring opinion in Lopv, Justice Thomas notes, "Put simply, much
if not all of Art. I, § 8 (including portions of the Commerce Clause itself) would be
surplusage if Congress had been given authority over matters that substantially affect
interstate commerce." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1644 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
1996]
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Constitution as originally intended. So what? What should be
done about it? There are at least two mutually exclusive
alternatives, with variations of each. One can follow the
Constitution, as originally intended, or one can follow the pre-
Lopez state of the law.
Consider the first alternative. How might one try to justify
following the Constitution as originally intended? There are at
least two kinds of justifications one might offer. On the one
hand, one might argue from historical premises and from the
intrinsic nature of a written constitution. On the other hand,
one might argue from premises that do not give anyjustificatory
weight to history, as such, or to the intrinsic nature of a written
constitution, but rather assert that a reserved-powers federalist
system is desirable in terms of acceptable contemporary princi-
ples of political philosophy. I shall consider each mode of
justification in turn.
A. An Historical Justification
How might a version of the historical argument go?
Consider this one:
(1) If we know how the Constitution was originally
intended then we should follow that intention.
(2) We know that the Constitution was originally
intended to create a reserved-powers federalist
system.
(3) Hence, we should follow the Constitution's inten-
tion to create a reserved-powers federalist system.
I have already argued in support of Premise (2). It is
difficult to imagine how (2) could more obviously be true.
Again, if anything is clear about the Constitution, this much
is-it was intended to establish a reserved-powers federalist
system. Thus, in light of the obviousness of the historical intent,
we do not have to concern ourselves here with the special
difficulties raised by legal issues concerning which there is no
clearly discernible historical intent.'
How might Premise (1) be supported? It is a notable fact
48. For a discussion of some of the problems arising in such cases, see Russell
Pannier, AnAnalysis of the Theoy of Original lntent, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 695 (1992)
(evaluating the theory of original intent as a principle of judicial interpretation of
legislative and constitutional rules).
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about the current state of constitutional debate that there is even
a serious question here. After all, a layperson might well ask,
'Just what do you mean by asking for justifications for following
the Constitution, as originally intended? Of course, one should
follow the Constitution. Who could possibly doubt it?"
In response to this last question, one might begin by
observing that many lawyers not only doubt it, but reject it.
Why? One major cause is the widely-shared belief among lawyers
that a legal system based upon a constitution is simply an
institutional arrangement in which a set of unelected govern-
mental officials (e.g., members of the U.S. Supreme Court) have
the legal power to invalidate legislation on the basis of nothing
more than their own personal theories of good government.
According to this conception, the relevant constitutional
document's language and the original intentions motivating that
language are legally irrelevant. Of course, for reasons of public
appearances, if nothing else, one will probably do one's best to
use the words of the constitutional document. Thus, a propo-
nent of this view presumably would not hesitate to use the word
"commerce" to mean "any activity, process, event or state of
affairs." After all, "commerce" is just a word. Do not words
mean anything we choose? And if, in the end, one cannot find
words in the document with which to tie one's own preferred
meanings, then one can always assert that the constitution
somehowjust "requires" an "interpretation" that happily happens
to coincide with one's own philosophically preferred principles.
Of course, this is a large and difficult issue, and I will not
give it the attention it deserves. But I will say this much: there
are at least two very different conceptions of a constitution.
According to the one just mentioned, a constitution is not
primarily a set of legal principles expressed in an historical
document, but is rather primarily a set of persons with the legal
power to invalidate laws they do not like on the basis of their
own political philosophies. I shall refer to this as the conception
of "a constitution as a set of persons." For proponents of this
conception, there will generally be little or no point in formal
amendments of the constitutional document since whatever
words the relevant document happens to use, the final interpre-
tation of those words is completely in the philosophical hands of
judges who are the "real" constitution.
According to the alternative conception, a constitution is
19961
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primarily a set of principles expressed in an historical document
by persons who chose those principles to achieve particular
objectives and intended the linguistic formulations of the
principles to be interpreted in the light of those objectives. The
principles expressed in the document can be amended, but only
by compliance with the provisions for formal amendment set
forth in the document itself. I shall refer to this as the concep-
tion of "a constitution as a set of principles."
Of course, I have oversimplified the contrast. A proponent
of the conception of a constitution as primarily a set of historic-
ally-formulated principles would presumably be willing to
concede the inevitable role played by present interpreters of
those principles. Likewise, a proponent of the conception of a
constitution as a set of persons would likely concede the
inevitable role played by historically formulated principles. But
despite such complexities, the two conceptions differ in funda-
mental ways. A judge who thinks of a constitution as primarily
a set of persons will naturally tend to think of historically-
formulated principles as, at best, raw materials for fashioning
legal results of his own making on the basis of his own principles
of political morality. The primary factor for him will be what he
takes to be his own direct cognitive access to what he regards as
true principles of political morality. Given that direct cognitive
access, the language of the relevant constitutional document will
play only a derivative and instrumental role. Such ajudge would
presumably regard herself as justified in bending, twisting, and
in some cases, even ignoring, the words in the historical text if
such bending, twisting and ignoring is necessary or useful for
accomplishing substantive legal results that are desirable in terms
of her own philosophical principles.
On the other hand, a judge who thinks of a constitution as
primarily a set of historically-formulated principles will have a
very different understanding of his own activities. He will
naturally tend to think of the historically-formulated principles
as antedating, transcending and limiting his own judicial
discretion. He will regard his primary judicial responsibility as
that of being faithful to the words of the relevant constitutional
document and to the historical intentions grounding that
document. Of course, he will sometimes be compelled to invoke
some of his own principles of political morality. But such
occasions will be few and, when they arise, limited. For example,
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there will be the occasional necessity of choosing between
competing, but equally plausible, interpretations of the docu-
ment. But even then he will do his best to take care that any
personal principles he invokes are fully compatible with all of
the historically-formulated principles.
Any support for Premise (1) will have to be provided by the
conception of a constitution as a set of principles. It is only
when a constitution is understood as a historically-enacted set of
principles expressed in words with certain specific intended
meanings and directed to the attainment of certain specific
objectives that one would have any reason at all for even paying
attention to how the constitutional document was originally
intended. If, in contrast, a constitution is understood primarily
as a set of persons with the legal power to set aside laws based
upon their own conceptions of political morality, then neither
the historical intentions of those responsible for the words of the
document nor the specific meanings of the words they chose are
legally relevant.
So, the question becomes, "How can one justify invoking the
conception of a constitution as a set of principles?" The primary
justification is that a legal system that understands a constitution
as a set of principles is more likely to protect the natural moral
rights of its citizens than is a system which understands a
constitution as primarily a set of persons. The risk of arbitrary
governmental action is diminished. In such a system, the
government's action must be justifiable in terms of basic
constitutional principles whose meaning and force are beyond
the immediate political control of any agents of the government,
including the courts. If the government wishes to change those
basic principles, it must follow the relevant constitutional
provisions for formally amending the document. Any formal
amendment, at least in the case of the U.S. Constitution, will
require an appeal to the people.
In contrast, in a legal system based upon the conception of
a constitution as a set of persons, the government's actions need
be justifiable only in terms of the present political principles of
the reigning "constitutional body." Modifying the constitution
in such a system does not require any formal amending process
or appeal to the people. It merely requires changing the set of
political principles motivating the members of the highest
constitutional court-either by changing the minds of the
19961
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present members of that court, or by replacing them by others
with "better" political principles.
There is a sense in which in a system based upon the
conception of a constitution as a set of principles the latter are
ultimately within the control of the people. The original
linguistic formulation of the principles was adopted by the
people at some particular date, and any subsequent modifica-
tions of those principles must also be formally accepted by the
people. Thus, it is plausible to say of such a system that the
people "make their own rules"-one of the defining characteris-
tics of a genuine democracy.
In contrast, in a system based upon the conception of a
constitution as a set of persons, the constitutional principles are
ultimately in control of the government-not the people. Yes,
the original linguistic formulation of the constitutional rules may
have been adopted by the people, as it was in the United States.
But interpretations of those formulations, or any subsequent
formal amendments, are ultimately in the hands of a small set of
governmental agents-judges.
A closely-related consideration is the difference between the
ways in which each system regards language itself. In a system
based upon the conception of a constitution as a set of historical-
ly-formulated principles, there is a natural tendency to take
language seriously. Words and sentences in natural languages
are regarded as having certain specific meanings as opposed to
others. Speakers and writers choose certain words rather than
others for specific reasons. Their choices should be respected
and taken for what they purport to be. In particular, linguistic
formulations of legal rules, whether expressed in constitutions or
in ordinary statutes, should be respected and taken seriously. If,
in the formulation of a legal principle, the term "X" (e.g.,
"commerce") rather than the term "Y" (e.g., "activity, process,
event or state of affairs") is used then that choice should be
respected. Interpreters of the rule should not construe "X" by
means of the meaning semantically tied to "Y," unless, of course,
the rule itself has been formally amended to substitute "Y" for
"KX.
In contrast, the attitude toward language in a system based
upon the conception of a constitution as a set of persons is likely
to be quite different. Here the basic idea is that it really does
not matter much what the original rule-makers said or meant.
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What does matter is what the present interpreters of the rule
believe ought to be done about the current political situation.
There is a sense in which words, as such, do not matter. Surely,
the people can adopt linguistic formulations of legal principles.
But in doing so they are merely tossing their words out onto the
historical river of legal interpretation. Once upon the water, the
words are transformed into mere syntactical shells, stripped of
their intended and customary semantical ties, and are now freely
available for any newly-conceived semantical ties those blessed
with the legal power of final interpretation happen to prefer.
"Yes, they did use the word 'commerce.' But so what? They are
not on this court; I am. So, it is my preferences that count, not
theirs. I prefer a constitution which gives Congress general
welfare powers. If promoting that preference requires interpret-
ing 'commerce' to mean 'any activity, process, event or state of
affairs,' then that's what I will do."
Genuine democracy is more likely to survive in a legal
system of the former type than in one of the latter. Law itself,
in the form of rules and principles with relatively fixed and
stable meanings, whose boundaries are not subject to the direct
political control of the government, is more likely in systems of
the former kind. Law, in this sense, is a necessary condition for
genuine democracy. In the absence of stable rules with fixed
meanings binding both citizens and government, there can, in
the long run, be no Rule of Law and therefore little or no
chance for individual freedom from arbitrary governmental
coercion.49
Coming to the point, these considerations suggest the
following argument:
(1) Given any two legal systems, A and B, if a genuine
democracy is more likely to exist and survive in A
than in B, then A is preferable to B.
(2) A genuine democracy is more likely to exist and
survive in a legal system based upon the conception
of a constitution as a set of principles than in a
system based upon the conception of a constitution
as a set of persons. '
(3) Hence, a legal system based upon the conception of
49. For a discussion of the connection between the Rule of Law and democracy,
see F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
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a constitution as a set of principles is preferable to
a system based upon the conception of a constitu-
tion as a set of persons.
I have already argued in support of Premise (2). Premise
(1) is supported by all of the justifications that can be offered in
support of genuine democracy. The question whether genuine
democracy is preferable to alternative forms of government is a
difficult and serious one. But I shall not pursue it here.
What should we conclude about the question of an historical
justification for following the Constitution, as originally intend-
ed? We should accept the historical justification. We should
reject the pre-Lopez state of the law. If the nation wants to give
Congress general-welfare powers, it should have to formally
amend the Constitution to say so. But until and unless that is
done, the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
its obvious meaning and intent. That is how things ought to be
done in a nation conforming to the Rule of Law.
B. Non-HistoricalJustifications
Earlier I mentioned the possibility of offering non-historical
justifications for following the Constitution's purpose of establish-
ing a reserved-powers federalist system. Such justifications do
not give any weight to history, as such, or to the intrinsic nature
of a written constitution, but rather assert that a reserved-powers
federalist system is desirable in terms of the best principles of
political philosophy. I shall briefly outline two such justifications-
one negative in nature, the other affirmative.
The negative justification for federalism can be expressed as
a teleological argument:
(1) It is desirable to reduce the risk of arbitrary and
morally unjustifiable political coercion.
(2) A reserved-powers federalist legal system is a neces-
sary, or at least useful, means of reducing that risk.
(3) Hence, a reserved-powers federalist system ought to
be maintained.
The affirmative justification can also be formulated as a
teleological argument:
(1) It is desirable to maintain a legal system in which
there exists the conditions for the greatest possible
common realization of the essential human powers.
(2) Maintaining a reserved-powers federalist system is a
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necessary, or at least useful, means of achieving that
objective.
(3) Hence, a reserved-powers federalist system ought to
be maintained.
I have offered considerations in support of both arguments
elsewhere" and so shall not go into the matter here. Suffice it
to say that there are good reasons for believing that federalism
was a good idea in 1787, and still is. In part W.A., I argued that
if the nation wants a Congress with general-welfare powers, it
should have to formally amend the Constitution. I can now
make the point that, in doing so, the nation would be making a
serious mistake.
V. LOPEZ
I have argued that the pre-Lopez state of the law should be
rejected because it conflicts with the Constitution, as originally
intended. I shall now turn to Lopez to determine to what extent
the Court agrees with that conclusion.
In Lopez the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990,"1 which makes it a federal offense "for any individ-
ual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."52
The term "school zone" is defined as "in, or on the grounds of,
a public, parochial or private school" 3 or "within a distance of
1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private
school."54 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion,
which was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, in which
Justice O'Connorjoined. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring
opinion. Justices Stevens and Souter each filed dissenting
opinions. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsbergjoined.
It would have been an easy matter to uphold the statute by
invoking the pre-Lopez state of the law. The subject matter
directly regulated is possession of a firearm within a school zone.
60. Russell Pannier, Justifying Federaism, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 613 (1990).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988).
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)(A) (1988).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (25) (B) (1988).
1996]
19
Pannier: Lopez and Federalism
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
WILUAM MITCHELL LAW RVEW
Because that subject matter is not an enumerated federal subject
matter, one must use the Necessary and Proper Clause. As
always, a convenient enumerated power with which to tie this
particular use of the Necessary and Proper Clause is the
Interstate Commerce Power. There are several ways of doing
this. One way is arguing that it would be rational for Congress
to believe that a causal side effect of the statute would be a
reduction in the rate at which guns that, at some point in their
lives have been carried into a school zone, are later carried
across at least one state line. Another way is arguing as follows:
(1) Anything that tends to increase the Gross National Product
is likely to increase the volume of interstate commerce. (2) Any
law that tends to improve American education is likely to
increase the Gross National Product. (3) The statute would tend
to improve American education. (4) Hence, it would be rational
for Congress to believe that the statute would have at least one
causal side effect upon interstate commerce. This second
argument is essentially one of the primary arguments made by
Justice Breyer in dissent.
These, together with many other essentially similar argu-
ments, are tediously obvious. Prior to Lopez, a Constitutional
Powers teacher would expect any competent law student to be
able to recite them effortlessly upon demand. Thus, in rejecting
such arguments, the Court signalled its decision to change the
law of the Interstate Commerce Clause in some respect.
The Court clearly rejected any interpretation of the
Interstate Commerce Clause which effectively gives Congress
general-welfare powers. It observed in this regard, "We start with
first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government
of enumerated powers. " " And again, "But even these modern-
era precedents which have expanded congressional power under
the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer
limits."56  The Court specifically rejected Justice Breyer's
argument outlined above, with the observation that its "rationale
lacks any real limits."57  A fatal defect of his analysis is its
failure "to identify any activity that the States may regulate but
55. Lope, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
56. Id. at 1628.
57. Id. at 1633 (asserting that "Justice Breyer's rationale lacks any real limits
because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as
commercial").
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Congress may not. "58
The Court reaffirmed the rational basis standard of review
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, as tied to the Interstate
Commerce Clause: "Since that time, the Court has heeded that
warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis
existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently
affected interstate commerce."59 However, it also said that the
regulated activity in question must "substantially" affect interstate
commerce.' In this regard, after observing that its prior cases
had not been completely clear as to whether the required
relationship to interstate commerce is one of merely "affecting"
or "substantially affecting," the Court said, "We conclude,
consistent with the great weight of our case law, that the proper
test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity
'substantially affects' interstate commerce."61
The Court specified three categories of activities that
Congress may regulate under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce ....
The Court went on to say that the challenged statute could
not be justified in terms of either of the first two categories.63
Hence, if it isjustifiable at all, it must be justified in terms of the
third category, as a regulation of an activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.64
In regard to the third category, the Court stated, "[W] e have
upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate
economic activity where we have concluded that the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce."' It mentioned, as
58. Id. at 1632.
59. Id. at 1629.
60. Id. at 1629-30 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1988)).
61. Id. at 1630.
62. Id. at 1629-30 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 1630.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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examples, intrastate coal mining,6 6 intrastate credit transac-
tions, intrastate restaurants,' intrastate hotels,69 and pro-
duction and consumption of home-grown wheat.7"
But the Court rejected the claim that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act fits within the boundaries of the third category.
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.
Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with
a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.7
In a footnote keyed to the end of the first sentence in the
foregoing quotation the Court said,
Under our federal system, the "States possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law." "Our
national government is one of delegated powers alone.
Under our federal system the administration of criminal
justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within
the scope of those delegated powers, has created offenses
against the United States." When Congress criminalizes
conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it
effects a "change in the sensitive relation between federal and
state criminal jurisdiction."72
The Court pointed to the absence of any jurisdictional
element in the statute that would guarantee, "through case-by-
case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce.""3 The statute "has no express jurisdic-
tional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of
firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
66. Id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S.
264, 276-80 (1981)).
67. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
68. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
69. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
70. Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
71. Id. at 1630-31.
72. Id. at 1631 n.3 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 1631.
[Vol. 22
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss1/11
LOPEZ AND JEDERALISM
with or effect on interstate commerce."7 4
The Court also noted the absence of congressional findings
concerning effects on interstate commerce.75 It conceded that
"Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as
to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce." 6  But on the other hand, "to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here."77
The Court specifically addressed the Government's argu-
ments for the proposition that possession of a gun in a school
zone substantially affects interstate commerce.7" One of the
Government's arguments was that such possession may result in
violent crime and that crime affects the national economy in two
ways.79 First, the substantial costs of crime are spread through
the mechanism of insurance.' Second, crime impairs incen-
tives to travel to unsafe areas of the country.
8'
In addition, the Government argued that the possession of
guns in school zones threatens the learning environment, that
anything that threatens the learning environment causes a less
productive citizenry, and that a less productive citizenry causes
a reduction of the nation's economic well-being.
8 2
The Court rejected both arguments:
85
The Government admits, under its "costs of crime" reasoning,
that Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all
activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce. Similarly,
under the Government's "national productivity" reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for exam-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1632.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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ple. Under the theories that the Government presents... it
is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to
accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate.84
In summation, the Court said that having a gun within a
school zone is not an economic activity that could, "through
repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school;
there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of
the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce."
85
Upholding this statute would effectively give Congress a general
police power under the Commerce Clause of the kind retained
by the states.8 6 That would be impermissible:
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps
down that road, giving great deference to congressional
action... The broad language in these opinions has suggest-
ed the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here
to proceed any further. To do so would require us to
conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does
not presuppose something not enumerated ... and that
there never will be a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local .... This we are unwilling to do. 7
VI. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF LOPEZ
What are the implications of Lopez for the future? Answer-
ing that question requires an examination of at least some of the
alternative ways of interpreting the case. I shall specify some of
these alternative interpretations and offer brief comments on
each.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 1634.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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A. Interpretation (1): Congress can guarantee the constitutionality
of any such statute simply by inserting a jurisdictional element
requiring a connection to interstate commerce as a condition of the
statute's applicability.
This interpretation finds apparent support in the Court's
observation that the statute in question lacked any jurisdictional
element that would require "through case-by-case inquiry, that
the firearm possession in question affects interstate com-
merce."8 This suggests that the statute would have been
upheld if it had included a provision requiring that any such
gun, or perhaps even any of its component parts, had previously
been, or subsequently was, carried across a state line.
But if that is all that Lopez means, it is not a significant
result. Congress could always easily avoid its impact by inserting
a jurisdictional element in every such statute. Admittedly, such
jurisdictional requirements would increase, to some extent, the
prosecutorial burden upon the United States, but that does not
seem nearly sufficient to significantly limit the general-welfare
powers Congress had under the pre-Lopez cases.
B. Interpretation (2): Congress can guarantee the constitutionality
of any such statute by simply making explicit findings concerning
the statute's relation to interstate commerce.
This interpretation finds support in the Court's observation
that the statute in question was not accompanied by congression-
al findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of
gun possession in school zones.89 But, again, if this is all that
Lopez means, it is not significant, when evaluated against the goal
of bringing the nation back to a reserved-powers federalism.
Congress could always find something to say about any statute's
relationship to interstate commerce. If law students can do it,
Congress can.
C. Interpretation (3): The meaning of the word "commerce" in the
Interstate Commerce Clause is restricted to commercial activities in
the ordinary sense.
Perhaps some support for this interpretation is afforded by
88. Id. at 1631.
89. Id.
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the Court's repeated observation that the mere possession of a
gun in a school zone is not commercial activity in the ordinary
sense of "commercial."90
If the Court intended to limit the scope of the term
"commerce" in the Interstate Commerce Clause, then Lopez
would be a very significant result. As I have argued, a crucial
step in the process of giving Congress general-welfare powers was
the Court's interpretation of "commerce" as "any activity,
process, event or state of affairs-human or nonhuman,
commercial or noncommercial."9 1 It gives Congress the power
to directly regulate interstate "commerce" in any way it wishes,
for any reason it chooses. Further, given this limitless semantical
scope of the word "commerce," Congress has equally limitless
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to indirectly
regulate interstate "commerce" in any way it wishes, for any
reason it chooses. Cutting down the semantical scope of
"commerce" would be a large step in the direction of a reserved-
powers federalist system.
But there are at least two reasons why this interpretation of
Lopez cannot stand. First, the Court did not explicitly say so.
One would naturally expect it to announce such a dramatic
change in the law if it had thought of itself as making it.
Second, it did explicitly reaffirm the principle that Congress can
directly regulate interstate commerce in any way it wishes,9" for
any reason it chooses.93 Obviously, that principle is incompati-
ble with any semantical restriction of the word "commerce" to
commercial activities in the ordinary sense.
Thus, it seems that, however the Court's comments about
"commerce" should best be construed, they should not be
understood to mean that Congress' power of direct regulation
over interstate commerce is now limited to commercial activities
90. Id. at 1630-31 (asserting that the criminal statute regulating possession of
handguns near a school zone is a "statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms"); see also id. at 1634 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce.").
91. See supra part II.A. (defining "commerce").
92. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
93. Id. (stating that Congress may even regulate commerce to keep it free of
"immoral and injurious uses") (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917)).
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in the ordinary sense.
D. Interpretation (4): The Darby method of legislation is
unconstitutional.
In part II.E I described the Darby method of legislation as
consisting of two Congressional actions. First, Congress enacts
a statute prohibiting some interstate aspect, or causal side effect,
of some given activity. Second, Congress enacts a statute
prohibiting the activity itself. As I argued, the Darby method of
legislation affords Congress an especially powerful general-
welfare tool.
The Court's comments about gun possession in school zones
not being "commercial" activity in the ordinary sense might
suggest that Lopez intends to impose some limitation upon the
Darby method.94 For crucial to the Darby method is the princi-
ple that Congress can directly regulate interstate "commerce" in
any way it wishes, for any reason it chooses.
However, for the reasons I mentioned in part VI.C., I do not
believe that Lopez should be interpreted as reaching such a
radical result. Further, it should be noted that the Court
specifically cited Darby in an apparently approving way.
95
Finally, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, in a concurring
opinion, said with respect to Darby, along with other modem
cases, "These and like authorities are within the fair ambit of the
Court's practical conception of commercial regulation and are
not called in question by our decision today."96
Thus, it seems that the Court did not intend to overrule or
limit Darby. If that is so, then Congress could easily avoid the
limitations of Lopez by amending the Gun-Free School Zones Act
to conform to the Darby principles. One section of an amended
statute could prohibit the interstate transportation of any gun,
or any of its component parts, that, at any time during its
previous existence, was possessed by a person who was at that
very time within 1,000 feet of a school. This first section would
presumably be upheld on the basis of the principle that Con-
gress can directly regulate interstate "commerce" in any way it
94. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
95. Id. at 1629 (stating that "Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a
'substantial effect' on interstate commerce") (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 119-20).
96. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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wishes, for any reason it chooses. A second section of the
amended statute would prohibit the possession of any gun within
1,000 feet of any school. The section would presumably be
upheld because it is a reasonable means of reducing the rate at
which members of the class of guns regulated by the first section
cross state lines.
E. Interpretation (5): There are special limitations upon the use of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, as linked to the Interstate
Commerce Clause, when the subject-matter directly regulated is not
itself "commercial," in the ordinary sense.
The Court's remarks, already commented on for other
purposes in parts VI.C. and VI.D., that the mere possession of a
gun in a school zone is not itself "commercial" activity in the
ordinary sense97 suggests some limitation upon uses of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in such contexts. But what
precisely those limitations are is uncertain. There are alternative
ways of interpreting the Court's remarks.
One might interpret them as stating that Congress cannot
regulate noncommercial subject-matters under the Necessary and
Proper Clause at all. That would be a drastic limitation upon
Congress' pre-Lopez general-welfare powers. But it is doubtful
that the Court intended to suggest this. Its comments about the
lack of a jurisdictional element and congressional findings,
discussed in parts VI.A and VI.B., suggest that Congress could
have constitutionally regulated gun possession in school zones if
it had remedied those deficiencies, as it could easily have done.
A less radical interpretation would take these remarks about
"commerce" as stating that regulations of noncommercial matters
under the Necessary and Proper Clause raise some kind of
rebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality. That is, such
regulations trigger a heightened degree ofjudicial scrutiny. This
interpretation seems consistent with Justice Souter's dissent,
which said about the majority opinion: "There is today, however,
a backward glance at both the old pitfalls, as the Court treats
deference under the rationality rule as subject to gradation
according to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the
97. Id. at 1630-31.
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immediate subject of the challenged regulation.""8
This less radical interpretation is probably the preferable
one. But, again, if this is the result the Court intended, it is not
a significant limitation upon Congress' general-welfare powers,
especially if Congress can satisfy the heightened scrutiny simply
by inserting jurisdictional elements or congressional findings in
their enactments.
E Interpretation (6): There are special limitations upon the use of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, as linked to the Interstate
Commerce Clause, when the subject-matter directly regulated has
been traditionally regulated by the states.
This interpretation is supported by those passages in which
the Court observed that the Gun-Free School Zones Act invades
subject matter areas traditionally regulated by the states. For
example, the Court noted that, "Under our federal system, the
'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law."' 99 Similarly, the Court said,
[U]nder the Government's "national productivity" reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for exam-
ple. Under the theories that the Government presents... it
is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign."
As for Interpretation (5), there are different ways of
construing these remarks. On the one hand, they might be
interpreted as stating that C ongress cannot regulate such subject
matters at all with the Necessary and Proper Clause. Of course,
that would be a dramatic limitation upon Congress' powers. But,
again, it seems doubtful that the Court intended to say anything
like this.
A more plausible, and less dramatic, interpretation would
construe the Court's statements as merely indicating that
98. Id. at 1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court's commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction is similar to the direct/indirect distinction because of
its line drawing and its attempt to calibrate the amount of deference given to Congress
according to how commercial the regulated activity is).
99. Id. at 1631 n.3 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 1632 (citation omitted).
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regulations of subject matters traditionally regulated by the states
trigger some kind of heightened judicial scrutiny. If this is the
result intended by the Court, then no significant limitation upon
Congressional power has been effected.
VII. LOPEZ IS NOT ENOUGH.
I have argued that the meaning of Lopez is uncertain to
some degree. But, however Lopez itself should best be interpret-
ed, it seems doubtful that it stands for any principle that would
seriously inhibit Congress' regulatory powers. Anyone desiring
a return to something close to a reserved-powers federalism
would naturally want something more than Lopez apparently
affords.
What might that something more be? I shall briefly offer a
few suggestions.
A. "Commerce"
Any serious step in the direction of a reserved-powers
federalism must include an interpretation of the word "com-
merce" that brings it back to its customary and intended
meaning. I have argued that in the modern era the Court has,
in effect, interpreted it as meaning "any activity, process, event
or state of affairs-human or nonhuman, commercial or
noncommercial." 10 ' That is not only an unreasonable interpre-
tation, but one guaranteed to give Congress vastly greater powers
than the Framers intended.
A much more reasonable interpretation would limit
"commerce" to the activities of buying, selling or exchange, and
to the activity of transportation for the purpose of engaging in
those activities."' Justice Thomas argued convincingly in his
concurring opinion that this is the sense in which "commerce"
was used and intended by the Framers.' As he observed,
commercial activities in this sense must be distinguished from
the activities of manufacturing and agriculture.0 4
If the nation wishes to give Congress the power to directly
regulate the interstate aspects of "any activity, process, event or
101. See supra part II.A.
102. Id. at 1643 (ThomasJ., concurring).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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state of affairs" then it should have to amend the Constitution to
say precisely that. °5
B. "Interstate"
It seems that the meaning of "interstate" could safely be left
where it is under the Court's modern cases. 106  "Interstate"
should be construed as meaning "crossing a state line." Thus,
putting the meaning of "interstate" together with that of
"commerce," yields the proposition that interstate commerce
includes any transaction of buying, selling or exchange that
crosses a state line.
C. "Regulate"
In contrast to the situation with "interstate," any reasonably
adequate interpretation of "regulate" requires a significant
departure from the Court's current usage. As I observed in part
II.C., the Court construes "regulation" to include any rule,
including an absolute prohibition. This is far too inclusive, given
the Framers' primary purpose for the Interstate Commerce
Clause.
That the Court's current interpretation is too inclusive can
be seen by thinking about some of its logical consequences. If
"regulation" includes any rule, including an absolute prohibition,
then Congress could, for example, enact legislation prohibiting
all commerce between the states. If that example strikes you as
politically unlikely, and it probably is, consider one that is more
likely. Under the Court's current interpretation of "regulate,"
Congress could constitutionally enact legislation prohibiting the
importation of, say, tires, into a particular state for the protec-
tionist purpose of giving special help to that state's local tire
industry at the expense of tire interests in other states. It is easy
to imagine this sort of legislation tacked on to a bill as a pork-
barrel rider.
The reason such examples are relevant is that they illustrate
how far the Court has departed from the original purpose of the
105. "The Constitution not only uses the word 'commerce' in a narrower sense than
our case law might suggest, it also does not support the proposition that Congress has
authority over all activities that 'substantially affect' interstate commerce." Id. at 1644
(Thomas, J., concurring).
106. See supra part II.B.
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Interstate Commerce Clause. Putting the matter in contempo-
rary terms, that purpose was to give Congress the power to create
the conditions for an efficient national common market-a
market in which goods, services, capital and labor can flow freely
to their highest valued uses, as measured by the willingness to
pay, unhindered by the arbitrary and economically-inefficient
barriers of state boundaries. The examples show that Congress
could constitutionally enact legislation that directly conflicts with
that basic purpose.
That purpose must be understood against the historical
background of the nation's experience under the Articles of
Confederation-a period in which the states often sought to
protect their own domestic economic interests at the expense of
economic interests in other states. In arguing for the desirability
of giving to Congress the power to regulate trade between the
states, Alexander Hamilton said the following:
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States,
contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different
instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to
others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if
not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and
extended till they became not less serious sources of animosi-
ty and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse
between the different parts of the Confederacy. "The
commerce of the German empire is in continual trammels
from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes
and states exact upon the merchandises passing through their
territories, by means of which the fine streams and navigable
rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are rendered
almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this
country might never permit this description to be strictly
applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect from the
gradual conflicts of State regulations that the citizens of each
would at length come to be considered and treated by the
others in no better light than that of foreigners and
aliens.
0 7
Thus, the fundamental problem is that the Court's current
interpretation of "regulate" gives Congress the power to directly
regulate interstate activities for purposes that have no serious
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). For a similar observation, see THE FEDERAUST No. 42, at 267-68 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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relationship to the purpose of creating the economic conditions
for an efficient national common market. The remedy is
construing "regulate" in a way that precludes such congressional
departures from the Constitution's intent.
Here is one possibility: Given a congressional statute that
governs interstate commerce, as defined in parts VII.A. and
VII.B., the statute is a regulation of interstate commerce if and
only if (1) Congress' primary purpose in enacting the statute is
that of helping create the conditions for an efficient national
common market by reducing the extent to which state bound-
aries operate as inefficient barriers to the free flow of goods,
services, capital and labor throughout the nation, and (2) the
statute is likely to promote that objective.
Given this interpretation of "regulate," Congress could, for
example, constitutionally enact legislation ensuring the freedom
of interstate truckers from discriminatory state regulations. But
Congress could not, for example, constitutionally enact legisla-
tion prohibiting the interstate transportation of heroin or
kidnapped persons.
Putting this interpretation of "regulate" together with the
recommended interpretations of "commerce" and "interstate,"
we have the following proposition: Legislation under the
Interstate Commerce Clause is constitutional if and only if (1)
the legislation directly governs the activities of buying, selling or
exchange, or the activity of transportation for the purpose of
engaging in those activities, (2) the legislation directly governs
only the interstate aspects of those activities, (3) the primary
purpose of the legislation is that of helping create the conditions
for an efficient national common market by reducing the extent
to which state boundaries operate as inefficient barriers to the
free flow of goods, services, capital or labor throughout the
nation, and (4) the legislation is likely to promote that purpose.
D. "Necessary and Proper"
AsJustice Thomas noted, no amount of semantical reshap-
ing of the terms "commerce," "interstate," and "regulate" will, by
itself, serve to significantly limit Congress' powers unless the
semantical boundaries of the words "necessary and proper" are
1.9961
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also reshaped.10
8
Under the Court's current interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Congress has the power to regulate any
nonfederal subject matter by means of a statute so long as it
would be rational for Congress to believe that among the causal
effects of the statute would be at least one effect upon the rate
at which some activity, process, event or state of affairs crosses a
state line. This foreseeable impact upon something in interstate
commerce does not have to be any part of Congress' primary
purpose in enacting the statute. It is sufficient that the foresee-
able effect be merely a "side effect." But this interpretation of
"necessary and proper" effectively gives Congress power to
regulate nonfederal matters in any way it wishes, for any reason
it chooses. For, any regulation will have some causal effect upon
the rate at which something or other crosses state lines.
Defining the words "commerce" and "interstate" more
narrowly would not remedy this problem. Even if the meaning
of the term "interstate commerce" were limited to the interstate
aspects of the activities of buying, selling or exchange and the
activity of transportation for the purpose of engaging in those
activities, it would presumably still be the case that any federal
regulation would have some foreseeable causal side effect upon
interstate commerce, even in that narrowed sense.
An analogy might help. Suppose, as seems plausible, that
anything a person does, while remaining on the planet Earth
anyway, has some foreseeable effect upon the planet's environ-
ment, if nothing else, a discharge of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere. Now suppose that the Government decrees that any
person can do anything she or he wishes so long as that action
has at least one causal side effect upon the earth's environment.
Obviously, this decree would not limit the citizens' activities in
any way. There is a sense in which the condition would be
pointless; it would not operate as a limitation of any kind.
So, the Court's current interpretation of "necessary and
proper" will not do. Here is another suggestion that might serve
to significantly limit Congress' power: A congressional enact-
ment of a statute governing a nonfederal matter is a constitution-
108. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that an
interpretation of clause three that makes the rest of section eight superfluous simply
cannot be correct).
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al use of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as linked to the
Interstate Commerce Power, if and only if (1) the primary
purpose of the statute is the promotion of the regulation of
interstate commerce, in the senses recommended in parts VII.A.,
VII.B. and VII.C, and (2) the statute is likely to promote that
purpose.
VIII. FEDERALISM AND STATE IMMUNITY
The modest movement of the Court toward a genuine
reserved-powers federalism under the Interstate Commerce
Clause in Lopez does not stand alone. The Court had already
taken a step in the direction of federalism with respect to the
issue of state immunity from federal regulation.
As a general matter, any reserved-powers federalist system
must incorporate at least some measure of state immunity from
federal regulatory power. For consider any purported reserved-
powers system lacking such an immunity. Then consider any
subject-matter, S, within the scope of the states' alleged reserved
powers. If the states have no immunity from federal regulation
then the national legislature could enact legislation requiring the
states to regulate S in some particular manner. But then the
states would not be free to regulate S in ways that conflict with
the federal mandate. Because this pattern could be repeated for
any subject matter, the system would not be a genuine reserved-
powers system at all.
Thus, constitutional theory requires that reserved-powers
systems afford their constituent states some degree of regulatory
immunity. Has the Court seen it that way? At times, it has; at
others, it has not.
Before 1976 the Court regularly rejected challenges to
federal regulation of state activities. For example, in Case v.
Bowles," the Court rejected a challenge to the application of
a maximum price under the Emergency Price Control Act to a
state timber sale."' In California v. Taylor,"' the Court up-
held an application of the Railway Labor Act to a railroad owned
by a state." 2 In Parden v. Terminal Railway,"' the Court re-
109. 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
110. Id. at 101-02.
111. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
112. Id. at 564-65.
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jected a claim that a state-owned railroad was immune from
liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act." 4  In
Maryland v. Wirtz," 5 the Court upheld an application of the
wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
employees of public schools and hospitals." 6 In Fry v. United
States,"7 the Court upheld an application of the Economic
Stabilization Act limiting wage increases for governmental
employees.'
8
But despite such rulings, there were hints of possible
change. Dissenting in Wirtz, Justices Douglas and Stewart
contended that the interstate commerce power could not be
used in ways which unreasonably interfere with the states'
sovereign powers." 9  Dissenting in Fry, Justice Rehnquist
recommended that Wirtz be overruled. 2 In a footnote to the
majority's opinion in Fry, Justice Marshall stated the following:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as "a
truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not
been surrendered," . . . it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs
the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in
a federal system.' 2'
In a five-to-four decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery, "'22 the Court made good on these hints. Congress had
extended the maximum hour and minimum wage provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees. 23 The Court
invalidated the Act, as applied to state employees performing
traditional governmental functions. 4  Quoting from the
above-mentioned footnote in Fry, the Court said that Congress
cannot impair the states' integrity or their capacity to operate
113. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
114. Id. at 190-91.
115. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
116. Id. at 201.
117. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
118. Id. at548.
119. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
120. Fry, 421 U.S. at 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 547 n.7 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
122. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
123. Id. at 836.
124. Id. at 852.
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effectively in a federal system." 5 Application of the Act would
impose significant costs upon the states and limit their flexibility.
The Court said in conclusion, "insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional government
functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by"
the Interstate Commerce Clause.'26 Concurring, Justice Black-
mun said that, although he was troubled by some of the possible
implications of the majority's opinion, he was persuaded to join
it because he construed it as adopting "a balancing approach"
allowing for federal regulation "where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where state ... compliance with
imposed federal standards would be essential."' Dissenting,
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, argued
that because the political branches of the federal government are
designed to give the states the power to protect their own
interests, there is no need for judicial restraints upon applica-
tions of the interstate commerce power to state activities.""
Justice Stevens also dissented. 9
One of the technical weaknesses of the Court's opinion was
its ap;parent invocation of the Tenth Amendment as an indepen-
dent source of state immunity. The difficulty can be brought out
by considering this syllogism:
(1) No powers delegated to the federal government by
the Constitution are powers limited by the Tenth
Amendment.
(2) The interstate commerce power is a power delegat-
ed to the federal government by the Constitution.
(3) Hence, the interstate commerce power is not
limited by the Tenth Amendment.
The premises are true and the syllogism is deductively valid.
This reasoning suggests that the doctrine of state immunity from
federal regulation under the Interstate Commerce Clause should
be understood as a limitation upon federal power implicit in that
Clause itself, rather than as a limitation arising directly from the
Tenth Amendment.
125. Id. (quoting Fy, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7).
126. Usry, 426 U.S. at 852.
127. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,
Inc.,"5 ° the Court tried to clarify the principle it had articulated
in Usery.3  It summarized three conditions state-immunity
challenges to federal regulation must satisfy.
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute
regulates the "states as states." . . . Second, the federal
regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attri-
bute[s] of state sovereignty." . . . And, third, it must be
apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law
would directly impair their ability "to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions."1
32
In addition, the Court acknowledged the possibility of upholding
some federal laws, despite the satisfaction of all three of these
conditions, under the balancing test mentioned in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Usery. 13
In United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co.,
134
the Court, in a unanimous opinion, found no immunity for a
state-owned railroad from the Railway Labor Act because the
operation of a railroad is not a traditional governmental
function.1 35  In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Wyoming,136 the Court upheld an application of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act to state employees. The Court
divided five-to-four, withJustice Blackmunjoining the four Usery
dissenters. 137  The majority argued that the burdens imposed
upon the states were less than those imposed by the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions at issue in Usery.'
Then in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authori-
ty,139 the Court abruptly changed its mind, with Justice Black-
130. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
131. Id. at 287-88.
132. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262
(1964)). The Heart of Atlanta Motel Court had ruled that the means chosen by Congress
to regulate private activity must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the
Constitution. Heart of Atlanta Mote4 379 U.S. at 262.
133. Hode4 452 U.S. at 288 n.29 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 852-53 (1976)).
134. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
135. Id. at 686.
136. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
137. Id. at 228.
138. Id. at 240-41.
139. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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mun joining the four Usery dissenters to make a five-to-four
decision.)" At issue was an application of the federal minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to the employees of a municipally-owned mass transit system.
The Court overruled Usery, holding that the states no longer
have any substantive immunity from Interstate Commerce Clause
regulation."' Whatever immunity the states have is purely
"procedural":
[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme
imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as
States" is one of process rather than one of result. Any
substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause
powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of
this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate
for possible failings in the national political process rather
than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy. "142
Justices Powell, Burger, Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented. 4 '
The principle of procedural immunity articulated in
Garcia' was clarified in South Carolina v. Baker.45  Rejecting
a state immunity claim, the Court said,
Although Garcia left open the possibility that some extraordi-
nary defects in the national political process might render
congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the
Tenth Amendment, the Court in Garcia had no occasion to
identify or define the defects that might lead to such invalida-
tion... . Nor do we attempt any definitive articulation here.
It suffices to observe that South Carolina has not even alleged
that it was deprived of any right to participate in the national
political process or that it was singled out in a way that left it
politically isolated and powerless. . . . Where, as here the
national political process did not operate in a defective
manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated.'"
Thus, it appears that a state would have immunity from
federal regulation under Garcia only if it could prove the
existence of some serious procedural defect in the federal
140. Id.
141. Id. at 557.
142. Id. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
143. Id. at 557-89.
144. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
145. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
146. Id. at 512-13 (citations omitted).
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legislative process resulting in the challenged legislation. For
example, it might be sufficient for a state to prove that, just prior
to a crucial vote in the House on a bill imposing special burdens
on that particular state's operations, its representatives were
abducted out of the House Chamber at gunpoint and held in
confinement while the vote was taken. Such an immunity is
unlikely to reassure the states very much. It seems obvious that
Garcia effectively eliminates any meaningful state immunity.
But the state-immunity story is not yet complete. In spite of'
what it had said in Garcia, the Court ruled in favor of a state-
immunity challenge in New York v. United States.147 At issue in
New York was the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985."4 The Act provided as follows: "Each State
shall be responsible for providing, either by itself or in coopera-
tion with other States, for the disposal of... low-level radioactive
waste generated within the State."1 49  It authorized states to
"enter into such [interstate] compacts as may be necessary to
provide for the establishment and operation of regional disposal
facilities for low-level radioactive waste."50 The Act provided
for incentives of three kinds to encourage states to dispose of
waste generated within their own borders.
The first measure provided for "monetary incentives." One-
fourth of the surcharges collected by sited states (i.e., states with
disposal sites) were to be transferred to an escrow account held
by the Secretary of Energy, who would then make payments from
this account to any state which had complied with a series of
deadlines.' By July 1, 1986, every state was to have enacted
laws either providing forjoining a regional compact or stating an
intent to develop a waste-disposal facility within its own bor-
ders."'2 By January 1, 1988, every state was supposed to have
identified the state in which its disposal facility was to be located,
and every compact or "stand-alone" state was supposed to have
developed a siting plan.' By January 1, 1990, every state or
compact was supposed to have filed an application for a license
147. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
148. Id. at 149.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a) (1) (A) (1988).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a) (2) (1988).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (A) (1988).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(e)(1)(A), 2021e(d)(2)(B)(i) (1988).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(e)(1)(B), 2021e(d)(2)(B)(i) (1988).
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to operate a facility, or in the alternative, the governor of any
state that had not yet filed such an application must have
certified that the state would be able to dispose of all waste
generated within its borders after 1992.54 The remainder of
the escrow account was to be paid to every state or compact
capable of disposing of all low-level radioactive waste generated
within its own borders by January 1, 1993.155 Any state that
had not met the 1993 deadline would either have to take title to
the waste generated within its borders, or in the alternative,
forfeit to the waste generators the incentive payments it had
received.
1 56
The second measure provided for "access incentives." Any
state failing to meet the July 1986 deadline could be charged
twice the ordinary surcharge for the rest of 1986, and could be
denied access altogether to disposal facilities after 1986.157 Any
state failing to meet the 1988 deadline could be charged double
surcharges for the first half of 1988, quadruple surcharges for
the second half of 1988, and denied complete access after
1988."58 Any state failing to meet the 1990 deadline could be
denied access."i 9 Any state failing to file an application by
January 1, 1992, for a license to operate a facility, or any state
belonging to a compact which had not filed such an application,
could be charged triple surcharges.1'6
The third measure was a "take title provision." The Act
provided as follows:
If a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which
low-level radioactive waste is generated is unable to provide
for the disposal of all such waste generated within such State
or compact region by January 1, 1996, each State in which
such waste is generated, upon the request of the generator or
owner of the waste, shall take title to the waste, be obligated
to take possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all
damages directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or
owner as a consequence of the failure of the State to take
possession of the waste as soon after January 1, 1996, as the
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(e)(1)(C), 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iii) (1988).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) (1988).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C) (1988).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (2) (A) (1988).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (2) (B) (1988).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (2) (C) (1988).
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(e) (1) (D), 2021e(e)(2)(D) (1988).
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generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is
available for shipment.
161
The Court upheld the monetary and access incentives and
struck down the take title provision.1 62 It apparently addressed
the above-mentioned technical difficulty inherent in any state-
immunity ruling that invokes the Tenth Amendment as an
independent source of immunity:
Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the
limitations contained in the Constitution. Thus, for example,
under the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publish-
ers engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is con-
strained in the exercise of that power by the First Amend-
ment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of
Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the
Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment
confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject
to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the
States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine,
as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is
protected by a limitation on an Article I power. 63
Thus, the Court has apparently decided to ground the state-
immunity doctrine upon the implied limitations of the Interstate
Commerce Clause itself, as opposed to the Tenth Amendment,
now understood as simply an explicit recognition of the fact that
the affirmative grants of legislative power to Congress have their
own intrinsic limitations. 64
The Court distinguished the New York type of state-immunity
question from the kind of state-immunity issue raised in cases
such as Usery and Garcia. Cases of the latter type concern "the
authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally
applicable laws .... This case presents no occasion to apply or
revisit the holdings of any of these cases, as this is not a case in
which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation
applicable to private parties.""6 In contrast, the situation at
hand "concerns the circumstances under which Congress may
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C) (1988).
162. New York, 505 U.S. at 186-87 (1992).
163. Id. at 156-57.
164. Id.
165. New York, 505 U.S. at 201 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
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use the States as implements of regulation; that is, whether
Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate
in a particular field or a particular way." 66 Thus, apparently
the principle of Garcia still applies to situations in which
Congress imposes legislative burdens upon both state non-
regulatory activities and comparable private-sector activities. In
such contexts the states apparently have only the insignificant
"procedural" immunity already discussed.1 67
The Court then set forth "a few principles that guide our
resolution of this issue.""6  First, "Congress may not simply
'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.' 1 69  "While Congress has substantial powers to
govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate
concern to the States, the Constitution has never been under-
stood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States
to govern according to Congress' instructions." 70 In general,
the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate persons,
not states:
We have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel
the States to require or prohibit those acts. The allocation of
power contained in the Commerce Clause, for example,
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly;
it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments'
regulation of interstate commerce.17" '
On the other hand, this does not mean that Congress lacks
power to encourage the states to regulate in certain ways. There
are at least two methods, short of outright coercion, by which
Congress may constitutionally urge the states to regulate in
certain ways. "First, under Congress' spending power, 'Congress
166. Id. at 161.
167. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
168. New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
169. Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Co., 452 U.S. 264, 288)
(alteration in original). The Hodel Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 because it did not force the states to regulate mining. Hode,
452 U.S. at 288-89.
170. New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
171. Id. at 165 (citations omitted).
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may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds."'17 2
"Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate private
activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized
Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that
activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation."173
Turning to the merits, the Court ruled that the monetary
incentives were constitutional. 174 These incentives proceed in
three phases, each of which is permissible. In the first phase
Congress authorizes states with disposal sites to impose a
surcharge on radioactive waste coming from other states.
175
That measure is constitutional because it is an exercise of
Congress' power to authorize the States to burden interstate
commerce in ways otherwise prohibited by the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 76  In the second phase the Secretary of
Energy collects part of the surcharges and puts the money in an
escrow account. 177 That measure is constitutional because it is
a federal tax on interstate commerce, which can be based either
upon the interstate commerce power or the taxing power.
178
The third step provides that states that satisfy a series of condi-
tions are eligible to receive portions of the escrow fund.179
That phase is constitutional because it is a conditional exercise
of the spending power.180  Congress has the power to attach
conditions to federal funds, so long as the spending is for the
general welfare, and the conditions tied to the funds are clear,
reasonably related to the purpose of the spending, and do not
violate any independent constitutional prohibitions. 1 ' All of
these requirements are satisfied in the case at hand.
182
172. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
173. Id. at 167.
174. Id. at 165.
175. Id. at 171.
176. Id. at 167-68.
177. Id. at 171.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624. Even though Justice O'Connor cited South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 171 (1992)
as authority for these constitutional limitations on conditions on federal funds, she did
not mention one of the requirements mentioned in Dok, namely, that the conditions
not be coercive. Doe, 483 U.S. at 211. Whether this omission means that non-
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In summary, the set of monetary incentives "is thus well
within the authority of Congress under the Commerce and
Spending Clauses.""83 Hence, it does not violate any immunity
the states have from federal regulation.
The access incentives authorize states and regional compacts
with disposal sites to gradually increase the cost of access, and
eventually deny access completely, to wastes generated within
states failing to comply with the federal guidelines." 4 This
measure is constitutional because it is based upon Congress'
power to offer states the choice between regulating an activity
according to federal standards and having its own law pre-
empted by federal regulation: "States may either regulate the
disposal of radioactive waste according to federal standards by
attaining local or regional self-sufficiency, or their residents who
produce radioactive waste will be subject to federal regulation
authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their
disposal sites."185 The affected states are not compelled to
regulate because any burdens caused by their refusals to regulate
would fall on those who produce the waste and can find no
outlet for disposal, rather than upon the state as a sovereign
entity.
A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act's
milestones may devote its attention and its resources to issues
its citizens deem more worthy; the choice remains at all times
with the residents of the State, not with Congress. The State
need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal
program, if local residents do not view such expenditures or
participation as worthwhile. Nor must the State abandon the
field if it does not accede to federal direction; the State may
continue to regulate the generation and disposal of radioac-
tive waste in any manner its citizens see fit.18 6
The take tide provision is unconstitutional. It offers states
the choice between regulating pursuant to federal direction, on
the one hand, and taking title to, and possession of, the waste
generated within their borders and becoming liable for all
coerciveness is no longer a constitutional requirement is not clear.
183. New York, 505 U.S. at 173.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 174.
186. Id. (citations omitted).
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damages waste generators suffer, on the other."i 7 Here Con-
gress has "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from
coercion."1"
Neither of these alternatives would be constitutional
considered alone. On the one hand, Congress could not simply
transfer radioactive wastes from waste producers to state
governments. That would be essentially equivalent to a federally
compelled subsidy from state governments to waste producers.
The same can be said of the provision requiring the states to
become liable for their waste producers' damages. That would
be essentially equivalent to a federal statute requiring the states
to assume the liabilities of certain of their own residents.
Federal statutes of either kind would unconstitutionally "com-
mandeer" state governments into assisting federal regulatory
purposes. On the other hand, the second choice held out to the
states-regulating according to Congress' direction-would,
considered alone, be an unconstitutional order to state govern-
ments to implement federal legislation.
Hence,
[b]ecause an instruction to state governments to take title to
waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of
Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing
alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it
follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a
choice between the two. Unlike the first two sets of incen-
tives, the take title incentive does not represent the condition-
al exercise of any congressional power enumerated in the
Constitution. In this provision, Congress has not held out the
threat of exercising its spending power or its commerce
power; it has instead held out the threat, should the States
not regulate according to one federal instruction, of simply
forcing the States to submit to another federal instruction.
A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory
techniques is no choice at all. Either way, "the Act comman-
deers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program," an outcome that has never been understood to lie
within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Consti-
tution.'89
187. Id.
188. Id. at 175.
189. Id. (citation omitted).
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In summation, a state is not merely a political subdivision of
the United States. Governments at the state level are "neither
regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal
Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear
nowhere on the Federal Government's most detailed organiza-
tional chart. The Constitution instead 'leaves to the several
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,' .. . reserved
explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment." 190 Whatever
the limits of that retained State sovereignty may be, this much is
evident: "The Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program."191
Thus, the Court has taken a significant step in the direction
of a meaningful state immunity from federal regulation.
Congress cannot simply take over the legislative or administrative
apparatus of the states. On the other hand, it seems that at least
two additional steps should be taken to ensure the continuing
existence of a healthy reserved-powers federal system. First,
Garcia should be overruled. The distinction the Court draws in
New York between federal regulations bearing both upon the
states and the private sector, on the one hand, and federal
regulations bearing exclusively upon the states alone, on the
other hand, is both inherently unstable and unwise.
It is unstable because the distinction lacks constitutional
plausibility. Why should it matter whether Congress chooses to
burden just the states alone, on the one hand, or chooses to
burden both the states and the private sector, on the other?
Should not the states have the same sort of constitutional
immunity in either case?
It is unwise because refusing to give the states meaningful
substantive immunity in situations of the latter kind will subject
the states to the risk of drastic invasions of their sovereignty,
thereby threatening the foundations of our reserved-powers
federalist system.
Finally, the Court should impose stronger limitations upon
Congress' power to tie strings to federal funds allocated to the
States. So long as Congress has virtually unlimited power to
indirectly coerce the states through conditioned federal spend-
190. Id. at 188 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
191. Id.
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ing, whatever substantive immunity from direct federal regula-
tion the states may have or acquire under the Court's cases is
sharply diminished in practical importance by the immense
power of the federal purse.
IX. CONCLUSION
For a period of some sixty years prior to Lopez, the Court
interpreted the Constitution to effectively give Congress general-
welfare powers. That interpretation conflicts with the obvious
original intent of the Constitution-creating a reserved-powers
federalist legal system. Thus, we are forced to choose between
the Constitution and the Court's interpretation. For both
historical and nonhistorical reasons, we ought to follow the
Constitution. Lopez itself imposes some limitations upon
Congress' powers, but the extent of those limitations is ine-r-
tain. In any event, however best interpreted, they fail to advance
us far enough along the path of re-establishing a federalist
nation.
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